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Abstract Coexistence of identity-specific and financial externalities among bidders is a salient
feature of auctions with buyers who are cross shareholders or competing firms in an oligopoly.
This paper unifies these two types of externalities in revenue-maximizing auction design. Our
main findings are the following. First, these two types of externalities can be unified through
the framework of Myerson (1981). Both affect the winning probabilities through their impact
on players’ externality-augmented virtual values, while their impact on buyers’ payments is
reflected by an externality-correcting component for each type of externalities, which equals the
respective externalities. These components eliminate strategic bidding that would arise from
the existence of externalities. Second, the two types of externalities interact fundamentally
through shaping players’ virtual values. At the optimum, the player with the highest externality-
augmented virtual value wins given that it is positive, otherwise seller physically destroys the
item. Financial externalities amplify the impact of the identity-specific externalities on winning
probabilities. Third, our approach is applicable to revenue-maximizing auction design with
cross shareholding. Fourth, our finding renders an approach for revenue-maximizing auction
design with asymmetric financial externalities. Particularly, when seller does not value the
object, a revenue-maximizing auction can be obtained from any revenue-maximizing auction for
a regular setting without externalities by solely transforming the payments.
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1 Introduction
Many auctions are featured by the prevalence of allocative externalities among players (in-
cluding seller and bidders). An allocation outcome in an auction setting can be described
by the winner of the object and the payments of buyers (Myerson (1981)). Thus, allocative
externalities on any player can depend on both the identity of the winner and the buyers’
payments to allow for the most generality. The externalities are identity-specific if they
depend on only the identity of winner, while they are called financial externalities if they
are contingent only on buyers’ payments. While licensing an innovation among competi-
tors and selling nuclear weapons are employed to exemplify identity-specific externalities
(e.g.,Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996)), charity auctions (e.g., Goeree, Maasland,
Onderstal and Turner (2005), Maasland and Onderstal (2007) and Engers and McManus
(2007)) and bidding rings (e.g., McAfee and McMillan (1992) and Deltas (2002)) are more
concerned with financial externalities . While these two types of externalities do not al-
ways go together, auction situations are not rare where they do. An salient example is
an auction where buyers are cross shareholders who compete for a scarce resource. Since
each buyer holds a share of other’s profits, each buyer suffers a negative financial exter-
nality that equals a share of other buyer’s payments. On top of this, each buyer enjoys
an identity-specific externality that equals a share of the winner’s added value from win-
ning the auction (Dasgupta and Tsui (2004)). Though licensing an innovation among
competitors and selling nuclear weapons are mainly used to exemplify identity-specific
externalities, these examples actually also involve financial externalities. For example,
in the North Korea’s nuclear weapon case, while the seller (North Korea) puts great
identity-specific externalities on the buyers (China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, US) if it
keeps its nuclear arsenal, some buyers may also experience financial externalities due to
the payments of buyers. Some parties (e.g., South Korea) may prefer that North Korea
raises more money to support itself in order to alleviate the burden on them to support
North Korea, while others ( e.g., US) may not like North Korea to consolidate its power
by raising a lot of money. In the technical innovation licensing example, while the winner
imposes negative identity-specific externalities on losers’ profits, the buyers could also
gain utility from other competitors’ payments, since the higher payments of other buyers
certainly decrease their resources available for other dimensions of competition, such as
advertising expenses.
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Revenue-maximizing auctions focusing on a single type of externalities have been stud-
ied by a number of papers.1 Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996, 1999), Varma (2002),
and Brocas (2003, 2005) among others consider identity-specific externalities imposed
on losers by the winning buyer, while Goeree, Maasland, Onderstal and Turner (2005),
Maasland and Onderstal (2007) and Engers and McManus (2007) study the cases where
financial externalities among buyers depend on payments of themselves. The approaches
adopted for auction design with different types of externalities show little similarities and
connections, so do the derived revenue-maximizing auctions. Clearly, identity-specific and
financial externalities differ completely in nature. It remains in question whether auction
design with these two types of externalities can be unified in an integrated framework.
Furthermore, the existing insights say little on how to design revenue-maximizing auction
when both types of externalities prevail, since nothing has been revealed in the litera-
ture so far on how they might interact. In this paper, we adopt a setting where both
identity-specific and financial externalities exist and study the revenue-maximizing sell-
ing mechanism. This study illustrates that both types of externalities indeed affect the
revenue-maximizing allocation rule (the winning probabilities and payments) through the
same channel. In this sense, we provide a unified approach for obtaining the revenue-
maximizing mechanisms with pure identity-specific and/or financial externalities. More
importantly, our study further identifies the interaction between the two types of exter-
nalities in shaping the revenue-maximizing mechanism. This leads to a complete charac-
terization of the revenue-maximizing auction for the case where both types of externalities
matter.
Following Goeree, Maasland, Onderstal and Turner (2005), we begin with a setting
where financial externalities among buyers are proportional to the total payments of all
buyers. Diverging from their setting, we allow these proportions of externalities to differ
across buyers to accommodate more generality.2 While the literature largely focuses
on identity-specific externalities among buyers, in this paper we allow identity-specific
externalities among all players, including the seller and buyers. Situations abound where
the existence of identity-specific externalities between the seller and buyers is the major
1Dasgupta and Tsui (2004) is the only paper that derives the equilibrium strategy for standard auctions
with cross-shareholding. However, they have not touched the revenue-maximizing auction in this setting.
2A most general setup of financial externalities of linear form is addressed when auction with cross
shareholders is also studied in Section 5.
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concern. One recent example is the North Korea’s nuclear weapon case, where the seller
(North Korea) puts great externalities on the buyers (China, Japan, Russia, South Korea,
US) if it keeps its nuclear arsenal. Other examples where externalities exist between the
seller and buyers include selling retaliation in the WTO by a member country or selling
a soccer player by a club. We allow the bidders to be heterogeneous in both their value
distributions and identity-specific externalities that they enjoy/suffer. In particular, our
analysis does not require the identity-specific externalities to be uniformly positive or
negative.
One feature of our analysis lies in the option for the seller to physically destroy the
item. One should note that “destroying the item” differs from “not-selling”. In the
context of selling nuclear weapons, “dismantling” means “destroying” in this paper. In
previous auction design literature, destroying the auctioned item has not been formulated
as a possible outcome or as a nonparticipation threat. The significance of introducing
this option is the following. First, we can explicitly address under what conditions should
the seller destroy the object and what actions should be taken to maximize his revenue if
he destroys the object. Second, allowing this new option enlarges the freedom of auction
design with externalities. Destroying the item can be an optimal allocation outcome
for the seller or be used by the seller as an optimal nonparticipation threat, since it
eliminates the identity-specific externalities imposed on buyers. Specifically, eliminating
these identity-specific externalities has two effects. First, seller’s threat to a buyer who
refuses to participate can be made more severe. This happens when a buyer enjoys positive
identity-specific externalities whoever else keeps the object. In this case, the most severe
nonparticipation threat is to destroy the object. Second, the seller may extract higher rent
when he destroys the object if it is unsold. This can occur when the buyers suffer highly
negative identity-specific externalities when the seller keeps the item. In this situation,
the seller can be better off by committing to destroy the object and collecting a payment
from each buyer.
The revenue-maximizing selling mechanism is fully characterized in terms of the non-
participation threats, the winning probabilities, the probability of destroying the item, and
the payments of buyers. The two types of externalities interact fundamentally through
shaping players’ externality-augmented virtual values, which are obtained from the reg-
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ular virtual values by adjusting for the externalities and seller’s destroying cost.3 If only
buyer i does not participate, the item is then assigned to the one (including the seller)
generating buyer i the smallest identity-specific externality provided that this externality
is nonpositive. Otherwise the seller destroys the object. These nonparticipation threats
induce full participation of bidders. The winning probabilities are determined by the play-
ers’ augmented virtual values. Both types of externalities affect the winning probabilities
solely through the same channel of modifying players’ virtual values. The player with the
highest augmented virtual value wins given that it is positive. If no buyer wins, the seller
may keep the item or destroy it. The seller destroys the item if and only if his augmented
value is negative. A unique feature of the payment schedule is that every buyer’s payment
includes two externality-correcting components that equal the allocative identity-specific
and financial externalities, respectively.
The general findings are applied to various settings with pure identity-specific and/or
financial externalities. For symmetric settings in particular, we establish that modified
second-price and/or first-price auctions with appropriately set entry fee and reserve price
are revenue maximizing. Each buyer’s payments include an externality-correcting com-
ponent that equals the allocative externalities to him. Our study also leads to further
results on auction design for settings with pure financial externalities. Useful linkages
between revenue-maximizing auctions for settings with and without externalities are dis-
covered. In particular, for the case where the seller does not value the item,4 we establish
one-to-one correspondences between revenue-maximizing auctions with and without ex-
ternalities. We find that the revenue-maximizing auctions for a regular setting without
externalities need only be modified in the payments in order to be revenue-maximizing in
settings with financial externalities.5
The methodology developed is further applied to revenue-maximizing auction design
3Please refer to Lemma 2 for detailed definitions of players’ externality-augmented virtual values.
4This assumption is commonly adopted in the literature of auction design with financial externalities,
such as Maasland and Onderstal (2002, 2007) and Goeree, Maasland, Onderstal and Turner (2005) and
Engers and McManus (2007).
5Goeree, Maasland, Onderstal and Turner (2005) show that a lowest-price all-pay auction is revenue-
maximizing in symmetric settings of financial externalities. Applying our findings to their setting leads
to alternative revenue-maximizing first-price or second-price auctions. One advantage of the alternative
second price auction lies in that the maximal expected revenue is implemented through weakly dominant
strategy.
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with cross shareholding buyers who compete for a scarce resource. As each buyer holds
a share of other’s profits, each buyer suffers a negative financial externality that equals a
share of other buyer’s payments while enjoying an identity-specific externality that equals
a share of the winner’s added value from winning the auction (Dasgupta and Tsui (2004)).
Thus, the identity-specific externalities are perfectly correlated to the private information
of the winner. Furthermore, financial externalities in this setting takes the most general
form in the linear class. The general applicability of the methodology developed is further
evidenced through this application.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the ba-
sic model with both identity-specific and financial externalities. Section 3 derives the
revenue-maximizing mechanism for this setting. Section 4 applies the general findings to
further study revenue-maximizing auctions in settings with pure identity-specific and/or
financial externalities, respectively. Section 5 derives revenue-maximizing auction with
cross shareholding buyers. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Motivating Examples
Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996) present an example with N firms competing in
an oligopoly. A technical innovation will be licensed to only one firm. Whoever wins the
license will increase his market share. Thus the adoption of the innovation by the winner
will increase his profit, however, it will also decrease the profit of the losers. In this sense,
the winner imposes negative identity-specific externalities on losers. If the seller is also
a competitor, his adoption of the innovation also imposes identity-specific externalities
on the buyers. We can further imagine that the buyers could gain utility from other
buyers’ payments as they are competitors, since higher payments of the competitors in the
auction certainly decrease their resources available for other dimensions of competition,
such as advertising expense. The utility component from other buyers’ payments can
thus be modeled as financial externalities. These financial externalities effect could be
very significant especially when buyers are financially constrained as the auctioned object
could be very expensive such as those spectrum auctions.
The North Korea nuclear weapon case also mimics the above situation. China, Japan,
5
Russia, South Korea, US and others (such as Iran) could be considered as potential
buyers, while North Korea can be considered as the seller. Clearly, there are identity-
specific externalities among players as some may feel threatened if a particular country
holds the nuclear weapon. Moreover, one can see the existence of financial externalities for
the following arguments. Some parties (e.g., South Korea) may benefit from the money
that North Korea could raise to support itself since it can help to alleviate the burden
on them to support North Korea, while others ( e.g., US) may not like to see that North
Korea consolidates its power by raising a lot of money.
A third example where both identity-specific and financial externalities prevail emerges
simply due to cross shareholding among buyers. Consider a situation where buyers are
cross shareholders who compete for a scarce resource. Obtaining the resource increases
the value of the winner but does not affect the value of the losers. Since each buyer holds
a share of other’s profits, each buyer suffers a negative financial externality that equals
a share of other buyer’s payments. On top of this, each buyer enjoys an identity-specific
externality that equals a share of the winner’s added value due to winning the auction
(Dasgupta and Tsui (2004)). A salient feature of this example lies in that the identity-
specific externalities are rather determined by the winner’s added value that is his private
information. In this example, the identity-specific externalities are perfectly correlated to
the private information of the winner.
2.2 The Basic Setting
In this section, we first focus on a basic setting that accommodate the first two examples.
We will further study the setting of the third example with cross shareholding in Section
5. There is a seller who wants to sell one indivisible object to N potential buyers through
an auction. We use N = {1, 2, · · · , N} to denote the set of all potential buyers, where
N is public information. The seller’s value for the object is v0(≥ 0), which is public
information. Hereafter, we represent the seller as player 0 and bidder i as player i. The
ith buyer’s private value of the object is vi, which is his private information. These
values vi, i ∈ N are independently distributed on intervals [vi, vi] respectively following
cumulative distribution function Fi(·) with density function fi(·)(> 0). We assume the
regularity condition that the virtual value functions Ji(v) = v− (1−Fi(v))/fi(v) increase
on intervals [vi, vi]. The density fi(·) is assumed to be public information. The seller and
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the buyers are assumed to be risk neutral.
Player i enjoys/suffers an externality eij when player j obtains the item, i, j =
0, 1, · · · , N . By definition, eii = 0, i = 0, 1, · · · , N . These externalities are public
information.6 The auctioned item can be destroyed by the seller at a cost of c0 ≥ 0. If the
item is destroyed, no player enjoys/suffers any identity-specific externality. In addition,
there exist financial externalities among the bidders. Specifically, bidder i enjoys/suffers
an externality αi
∑
j∈N xj from every bidder’ payments xj, j ∈ N .7 We assume that
αi ∈ [0, 1), ∀i ∈ N and
∑
i∈N αi < 1.8
As a result, buyer i’s payoff is vi − xi + αi
∑
j∈N xj if he wins and pays xi; his payoff
is eij +αi
∑
j∈N xj − xi if he pays xi while another player j (seller or buyer) wins; and his
payoff is αi
∑
j∈N xj − xi if he pays xi while the item is destroyed. The seller’s payoff is
v0 +
∑
j∈N xj if he keeps the item; his payoff is e0i +
∑
j∈N xj if bidder i wins; his payoff
is ∑j∈N xj − c0 if the item is destroyed by him.
The game extends as follows. At time 0, the proportions αi, the seller’s value v0, the
destroying cost c0, the identity-specific externalities eij and the distributions of vi, i ∈ N
are revealed by Nature as public information. Every buyer i, i ∈ N observes his private
value vi. At time 1, the seller announces the rule of the selling mechanism. The possibility
of destroying the item by the seller is allowed. We assume that the seller has the power of
committing to the proposed rule. At time 2, the buyers simultaneously and confidentially
make their participation decisions and announce their bids if they decide to participate.
At time 3, the payoffs of the seller and buyers are determined according to the announced
rule at time 1.
Externalities lead to an auction design problem in which the buyers have mechanism-
dependent reservation utilities. Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996) have pointed out that for
6Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996) allow eij to be private information of player j. They however
found that this additional complication does not deliver additional insight. In Section 5, we consider a
case with cross shareholding where identity-specific externalities are private information of the party who
imposes the externalities.
7A most general setting where bidder i enjoys αijxj externalities from bidder j’s payments xj , j ∈ N
will be considered in Section 5 when revenue maximization with cross shareholders is addressed.
8Similar restrictions on the magnitude of financial externalities have been adopted by Goeree,
Maasland, Onderstal and Turner (2005), Maasland and Onderstal (2007) and Engers and McManus
(2007). This restriction guarantees the existence of revenue-maximizing mechanism. This will be clearer
when Lemma 2 is shown.
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a first price auction the best strategy of some bidders is simply not to participate to the
auction, although doing so does not avoid the negative externalities they may experience.
For this reason, we explicitly deal with the revenue-maximizing endogenous participation
and derive the revenue-maximizing mechanism while allowing endogenous entry.
Based on the “semirevelation” principle established by Stegeman (1996) that allows no
participation, we only need to consider truthful direct semirevelation mechanisms, which
require buyers to submit signals if and only if they participate, and reveal truthfully their
types if they participate. Following Stegeman (1996), we introduce a null message ∅ to
denote the signal of a nonparticipant.9 Let m = (m1, m2, · · · , mN), where mi is the signal
of buyer i and it takes values in Mi = [vi, vi] ∪ {∅}, ∀i ∈ N . Define M =
∏N
i=1Mi. The
seller determines how to allocate the object and how much each buyer pays, using a set
of outcome functions that accommodates all participation possibilities. These outcome
functions announced by the seller consist of the probability p0(m) for the seller to keep
the item, the winning probability functions pi(m) and payment functions xi(m) of buyer
i, ∀i ∈ N . Note that 1−∑Ni=0 pi(m) is the probability of destroying the item by the seller.
This set of allocation functions is denoted by (p,x). Following Jehiel, Moldovanu and
Stacchetti (1996), we assume that the buyers who do not participate have no chance to
win the object and their payments to the seller are zero, i.e., pi(m) = 0 and xi(m) = 0
if mi = ∅, ∀i ∈ N , ∀m ∈ M.10 In addition, clearly the feasibility of mechanism (p,x)
requires
∑N
i=0 pi(m) ≤ 1, ∀m ∈ M.11
Denote by E a pure-strategy entry pattern, in which Ti ⊂ [vi, vi] is the participating
type of bidder i. We say (p,x) is a truthful direct semirevelation mechanism implementing
entry E if and only if the following conditions hold:
(a) Buyer i with private values belonging to Ti participates and reveals truthfully his
value, i.e., if he participates, he gets expected utility which is equal to or higher than his
expected utility from nonparticipation.
(b) Buyer i with private values belonging to [vi, vi]\Ti does not participates, i.e., if he
participates, he gets expected utility which is equal to or lower than his expected utility
9Unlike the revelation principle whose applicability requires full participation of buyers, the “semirev-
elation” principle accommodates all entry patterns including the full participation.
10This assumption is consistent with the no passive reassignment (NPR) assumption adopted by
Stegeman (1996).
11It deserves to be pointed out that the mechanism (p,x) includes in itself all nonparticipation threats.
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from nonparticipation.
(c) pi(m) ≥ 0, ∀0 ≤ i ≤ N , with
∑N
i=0 pi(m) ≤ 1, ∀m ∈ M.
(d) pi(m) = 0 and xi(m) = 0 if mi = ∅, ∀i ∈ N , ∀m ∈ M.
When Ti = [vi, vi], ∀i ∈ N , we have the case of full participation. Any allocation out-
come (the winning probabilities and payments) implemented by a truthful direct semi-
revelation mechanism inducing any entry E is replicable through a full-participation
truthful direct semirevelation mechanism that treats signals in [vi, vi]\Ti as null signal ∅.
We can always modify the original truthful direct revelation mechanism that implements
entry E by treating bidder i’s signal mi ∈ [vi, vi]\Ti as ∅. The modified mechanism is thus
a truthful direct revelation mechanism that induces full participation.12 Therefore, there
is no loss of generality to consider only the truthful direct semirevelation mechanisms that
induce full participation for the revenue-maximizing mechanism.
It deserves to be pointed out that in our setting with allocative externalities, the
mechanisms should accommodate the null signal ∅ even though full participation should
be induced at the optimum. In particular, introducing the null signal ∅ is necessary for
describing the nonparticipation threats.13
3 The Revenue-Maximizing Mechanism
In this section we derive the revenue-maximizing mechanism when both identity-specific
and financial externalities exist. For any truthful direct semirevelation mechanism (p,x)
implementing full participation, the seller’s expected revenue is given by:
R(p,x) = Ev
{
(v0 + e0,0)p0(v) +
N∑
i=1
e0i pi(v)− c0
(
1−
N∑
i=0
pi(v)
)
+
N∑
i=1
xi(v)
}
= Ev
{
(v0 + c0 + e0,0)p0(v) +
N∑
i=1
(e0i + c0) pi(v) +
N∑
i=1
xi(v)
}
− c0, (1)
where v = (v1, v2, · · · , vN). The support of v is V =
∏N
i=1[vi, vi].
For buyer i with private value vi, if he submits signal mi ∈ Mi, his interim expected
payoff is given by:
Ui(vi, mi;p,x)
12Detailed proof is available from the author upon request.
13Condition (10) in Lemma 1 will further illustrate this point.
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= Ev−i
(
vi pi(mi,v−i) +
∑
j≥0
eij pj(mi,v−i)− xi(mi,v−i) + αi
∑
j∈N
xj(mi,v−i)
)
, (2)
where v−i = (v1, · · · , vi−1, vi+1, · · · , vN). The support of v−i is V−i =
∏N
j=1,j 6=i[vj, vj].
The seller’s optimization problem is to find the revenue-maximizing truthful direct
semirevelation mechanism (p∗,x∗) that implements full participation, i.e.,
max
(p,x)
R(p,x) (3)
Subject to:
(i) Ui(vi, vi;p,x) ≥ Ui(vi, ∅;p,x); ∀vi ∈ [vi, vi], ∀i ∈ N , (4)
(ii) Ui(vi, vi;p,x) ≥ Ui(vi, v′i;p,x); ∀vi ∈ [vi, vi], v′i ∈ [vi, vi], ∀i ∈ N , (5)
(iii) pi(m) = xi(m) = 0 if mi = ∅, pi(m) ≥ 0 , ∀i ∈ N ,
N∑
i=0
pi(m) ≤ 1 , ∀m ∈ M. (6)
Restrictions (4)-(6) come from conditions (a)-(d) of Section 2.2.
For any direct semirevelation mechanism (p,x), we define
Qi(vi;p) = Ev−ipi(v). (7)
If (p,x) is a truthful direct semirevelation mechanism implementing full participation,
then Qi(vi;p) is the conditional expected probability that buyer i wins the object if his
private value is vi.
Following similar procedure of Myerson (1981), we can show the following necessary
and sufficient conditions for a direct semirevelation mechanism to be a truthful one that
implements full participation.14
Lemma 1: Direct semirevelation mechanism (p,x) is a truthful direct semirevelation
mechanism that implements full participation, if and only if ∀i ∈ N the following condi-
tions and (6) hold:
Qi(si;p) ≤ Qi(vi;p), ∀vi ≤ si ≤ vi ≤ vi, (8)
Ui(vi, vi;p,x) = Ui(vi, vi;p,x) +
∫ vi
vi
Qi(si;p)dsi, ∀vi ∈ [vi, vi], (9)
Ui(vi, vi;p,x) ≥ Ui(vi, ∅;p,x). (10)
14The proof is omitted as it follows Myerson (1981) closely.
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Note that (10) differs from its counterpart in Lemma 2 of Myerson (1981). In Myerson
(1981), the utility level Ui(vi, ∅;p,x) that buyer i obtains if he does not participate is not
mechanism dependent. In particular, Ui(vi, ∅;p,x) is exogenous and fixed at zero in
Myerson (1981). However, in our setting with allocative externalities, Ui(vi, ∅;p,x) must
be determined by the mechanism adopted and thus can differ from zero.
Define γij = −αi if i 6= j and γii = 1 − αi. Define ΓN×N = (γij)i,j≥1 the payment
coefficient matrix. When ∑i∈N αi < 1, Γ is nonsingular as |Γ| = 1 −
∑
i∈N αi > 0.
Define b = (bi)N×1 = (Γ′)−11IN×1 where all elements in 1IN×1 are 1. We thus have
bi = 11−∑j∈N αj > 0, ∀i ∈ N .
15
Before we proceed to derive the expression for the seller’s expected revenue from a
truthful direct semirevelation mechanism, we further introduce the following definitions
of generalized virtual values of players.
Definition 0: (Externality-Augmented Virtual Values) J˜i(vi) = biJi(vi)+
∑
j∈N bjeji+
e0i + c0, i ∈ N are defined as the buyers’ externality-augmented virtual value functions;
and J˜0(v0) = v0 +
∑
j∈N bjej0 + c0 is defined as the sellers’ externality-augmented virtual
value.
Note that the externality-augmented virtual values cover the virtual values coined by
Myerson (1981) as a special case, while accommodating the flexibilities of identity-specific
and financial externalities as well as costs of destroying the object. When eij = 0, c0 =
0, αij = 0, ∀i, j, the externality-augmented virtual values degenerate to the standard
case. Clearly, since Ji(·) is an increasing function, J˜i(·) must be an increasing function as
bi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N .
Based on Lemma 1, we can replace (4) and (5) by (8), (9) and (10) in the seller’s
optimization problem. As a result, the expected revenue of the seller from a mechanism
(p,x) satisfying conditions (4)-(6) is given in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2: For a truthful direct semirevelation mechanism (p,x) that implements full
15For a setting of financial externalities where buyer i, i ∈ N enjoys an externality that equals a
proportion (denoted by ϕi ∈ [0, 1)) of the total payments of the other buyers. We assume
∑
i∈N
ϕi
1+ϕi < 1.
Then we have bi = 1(1+ϕi)(1−
∑
j∈N
ϕj
1+ϕj
)
> 0. I thank sander Onderstal who pointed out that this setting
of financial externalities is isomorphic to that of Section 2.2.
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participation, the seller’s expected revenue can be written as
R(p,x) = Ev
{ N∑
i=0
pi(v)J˜i(vi)
}
−
N∑
i=1
biUi(vi, vi;p,x)− c0. (11)
Proof: See Appendix.
Lemma 2 differs from its counterpart in Myerson (1981) in the following aspects.
First, a generalized version of virtual values appears in (11); Second, due to the financial
externalities, constants bj, j ∈ N appear both in J˜i(·) and before Ui; Third, there is no
term c0 in myerson (1981). From Lemma 2, we immediately have the following revenue
equivalence theorem.
Proposition 1: The seller and bidders’ expected payoffs from a mechanism that imple-
ments full participation are completely determined by the expected payoffs of the lowest
types of vi, i ∈ N and the players’ winning probabilities for all v ∈ V.
Proof: See Appendix.
We are now ready to characterize the optimal mechanism. Before we present the
revenue-maximizing selling mechanism, we first introduce the following definitions.
Definition 1: (Nonparticipation Threats) If only buyer i, i ∈ N does not participate,
the item is assigned to the one (including the seller) who brings him the smallest identity-
specific externality provided that it is nonpositive, otherwise the seller destroys the item.
All buyers pay zero.
The nonparticipation threats of Definition 1 share the same spirit with those of Je-
hiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996). As we do not employ transfers between seller
and participating buyers to further push down the nonparticipants’ payoffs, the threats
of Definition 1 might not be the strongest possible. Clearly, variety of threats are feasi-
ble that differ in requirement for seller’s commitment power and the degree of penalty.
Nevertheless, no matter what threats are adopted, there is no loss of generality to fo-
cus on full-participation mechanism for revenue-maximizing auctions, though the optimal
revenue depends on the strongness of the threats.
The nonparticipation threats of Definition 1 can be written equivalently as follows.
∀i ∈ N , let j0 = argminj≥0,j 6=ieij. If ei,j0 ≤ 0 , then set p∗j0(mi,m−i) = 1 where mi = ∅
and m−i ∈ V−i. If ei,j0 > 0, then set p∗j(mi,m−i) = 0, ∀j ≥ 0, where mi = ∅ and
m−i ∈ V−i. In addition, ∀j ∈ N , x∗j(mi,m−i) = 0 where mi = ∅ and m−i ∈ V−i.
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Definition 2: (Full Participation Winning Probabilities I) If all buyers participate
and buyer i, ∀i ∈ N submits signal mi ∈ [vi, vi], the object is assigned to the player
(including the seller) whose signal renders the highest “augmented virtual value”, provided
this value is nonnegative.16 Ties are broken randomly. If this value is negative, the object
is destroyed by the seller.
The full participation winning probabilities of Definition 2 follows closely the insight
of Myerson (1981). There are two major differences. First, the virtual values adopted
in Definition 2 have been much generalized to reflect the impact of identity-specific and
financial externalities as well as costs of destroying the object on optimal auction design.
Second, the possibility of destroying the object is modeled in our analysis for the first
time in the auction design literature to our best knowledge.
The full participation winning probabilities of Definition 2 can be written equivalently
as follows. ∀m ∈ V, ∀i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N},
p∗i (m) =



1, if J˜i(mi) > maxNj=0 ,j 6=i J˜j (mj ) and J˜i(mi) ≥ 0 ,
0, otherwise.
(12)
Definition 3: (Full Participation Payments I) Every bidder i, i ∈ N pays an entry
fee Ei = −minj≥0 eij. In addition, the winning buyer i pays J˜−1i (max{0,maxj 6=i J˜j(mj)});17
each losing buyer pays an externality-correcting payment (positive or negative) that equals
the allocative identity-specific externality to him.
Let x†(m) = (x†i (m)). We thus have x†(m) is the payments functions defined following
Myerson (1981) that is incentive compatible with the winning probabilities (12) while
ignoring the financial externalities. The full participation payments of Definition 3 can
be written equivalently as follows. ∀m ∈ V, ∀i ∈ N ,
x†i (m) =



J˜−1i (max{0,maxNj=0,j 6=i J˜j(mj)}) + Ei, if i wins,
eij + Ei, if j (≥ 0 ) wins, where j 6= i ,
Ei, if the object is destroyed .
(13)
Payments x†(m) have accommodated the impact of identity-specific externalities on
revenue-maximizing auction. To incorporate the impact of financial externalities, we have
to modify x†(m) and define the following set of payment functions x∗(m) = (x∗i (m)).
16We treat the seller’s signal as v0.
17We use J˜−1i (·) to denote the inverse function of J˜i(·), i ∈ N . If x < J˜i(vi), J˜
−1
i (x) is defined as vi;
if x > J˜i(vi), J˜−1i (x) is defined as vi.
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Definition 4: (Full Participation Payments II) x∗(m) = Γ−1 · x†(m), i.e., ∀m ∈
V, ∀i ∈ N ,
x∗i (m) = x
†
i (m) +
αi
1−∑Nj=1 αj
N∑
j=1
x†j(m). (14)
As x∗(m) = Γ−1 · x†(m), we have x†(m) = Γ · x∗(m). Based on Lemma 2 and the
above definitions, we are then able to present the revenue-maximizing mechanism as in
the following proposition.
Proposition 2: The nonparticipation threats of Definition 1, the full participation win-
ning probabilities and payments of Definitions 2 and 4 constitute a revenue-maximizing
truthful direct semirevelation mechanism. The mechanism implements full participation
of bidders. The expected payoff of bidder i of type vi is minj≥0 eij, which is nonpositive.
Proof: See Appendix.
According to Proposition 2, the two types of externalities interact fundamentally
through shaping players’ augmented virtual values, which completely determine the win-
ning probabilities. Both types of externalities affect the winning probabilities solely
through this channel of modifying players’ virtual values. From the definitions of the
augmented virtual values in Lemma 2, we see that the existence of the financial exter-
nality amplifies the impact of the players’ values and the identity-specific externalities on
the winning probabilities.
From Definition 4, we see a unique feature of the payment schedule. Every buyer’s
payments include externality-correcting components that equal the allocative identity-
specific externalities (eij if player j wins, zero otherwise) and financial externalities
(αi
∑N
j=1 x∗j(m)), respectively. This is clear as x∗i (m) = x
†
i (m) + αi
∑N
j=1 x∗j(m).
Proposition 2 answers the questions of when the object is destroyed by the seller
and how the seller should proceed to maximize his expected revenue if the item is to be
destroyed. From Proposition 2, we have the following results regarding the probability of
destroying the object.
Corollary 1: If J˜0(v0) ≥ 0, the object is never destroyed by the seller. If instead J˜0(v0) <
0, the object is destroyed by the seller with probability
∏N
i=1 Fi(J−1i (−
∑
j∈N eji − (1 −∑
j∈N αj)(e0i + c0))).18
18We use J−1i (·) to denote the inverse function of Ji(·). If x < vi − 1fi(vi) , J
−1
i (x) is defined as vi; if
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From Corollary 1, we see a necessary condition for the seller to destroy the item is that
∑
j≥0 ej0 < 0, i.e., the total identity-specific externalities on the bidders if the seller keeps
the item is negative. Another observation is that the existence of financial externalities
can be a force that contributes to destroying the item by the seller. This happens when
v0 +
∑
j≥0 ej0 + c0 ≥ 0, but v0 +
∑
j≥0 ej0
1−
∑
j∈N αj
+ c0 < 0.
We use (p0,x0) to denote the revenue-maximizing mechanism when the identity-
specific externalities are e0ij, i, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N}. When e0i0, ∀i ∈ N are negative enough,
we have minj≥0 e0ij = e0i0, ∀i ∈ N . Thus Ui(vi, vi;p0,x0) = e0i0, ∀i ∈ N from Proposition
2. From (11), the optimal expected revenue is
R(p0,x0) = −c0 −
1
1−∑j∈N αj
∑
j≥0
e0j0 +
∫
V
{
p00(v)(v0 + c0 +
∑
j≥0 e0j0
1−∑j∈N αj
)
+
N∑
i=1
p0i (v)(
Ji(vi) +
∑
j∈N e0ji
1−∑j∈N αj
+ e00i + c0)
}
f(v)dv.
Let R′(p0,x0) denote the value of the right-hand-side of R(p0,x0) when e0i0 decreases to
e′i0, i ∈ N . Clearly R′(p0,x0) ≥ R(p0,x0) as p00(v) ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose when e0i0 decreases to
e′i0, i ∈ N , the corresponding revenue-maximizing auction rule changes to (p′,x′). Denote
the optimal expected revenue by R′(p′,x′) when externalities are e′i0, i ∈ N . We must
have R′(p′,x′) ≥ R′(p0,x0). Therefore, R′(p′,x′) ≥ R(p0,x0), i.e., the seller’s optimal
expected revenue increase as externalities e0i0, i ∈ N decrease. This helps to explain why
North Korea tries to convince the relevant countries that it owns very powerful nuclear
weapons. This result holds whether or not financial externalities exist.
So far, we have focused on financial externalities where all bidders’ payments carry
symmetric weights. Maasland and Onderstal (2002, 2007) and Engers and McManus
(2007) rather allow other bidders’ payment have different impact than that of own pay-
ments. These cases can be similarly analyzed. We will consider the most general form of
linear financial externalities in Section 5.
x > vi, J−1i (x) is defined as vi.
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4 Applications to One Type of Externalities
Clearly, Proposition 2 applies to setting with one type of externalities. Revenue-maximizing
auctions with a single type of externalities have been well studied. In the case of pure
identity-specific externalities, Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996) has fully derived
the winning probabilities, though the payments schedule has not been fully characterized.
In the case of pure financial externalities, the literature (Maasland and Onderstal (2002,
2007) and Goeree, Maasland, Onderstal and Turner (2005) and Engers and McManus
(2007)) so far has rather focused on symmetric bidders. In this section, we apply Propo-
sition 2 and further present some more complete characterizations on revenue-maximizing
auctions for settings with one type of externalities.
4.1 The Case of Pure Identity-Specific Externalities
4.1.1 The General Setting
We first consider a general setting with pure identity-specific externalities, which allows
asymmetry across bidders. In other words, we consider the case where αi = 0, ∀i ∈ N in
the setting of Section 2.2. In this case, we have J˜i(vi) = Ji(vi) +
∑
j≥0 eji+ c0, i ∈ N and
J˜0(v0) = v0 +
∑
j≥0 ej0 + c0. Applying Proposition 2 leads to the following result.
Corollary 2: The nonparticipation threats of Definition 1, the full participation winning
probabilities and payments of Definitions 2 and 3, where J˜i(vi) = Ji(vi) +
∑
j≥0 eji +
c0, i ∈ N and J˜0(v0) = v0+
∑
j≥0 ej0+ c0, constitute a revenue-maximizing truthful direct
semirevelation mechanism.
4.1.2 Symmetric Setting
We now show that the revenue-maximizing mechanism of Corollary 2 reduces to a mod-
ified second price auction in a symmetric setting. In this symmetric setting, Fi(·) =
F (·), fi(·) = f(·) on support [v, v], ∀i ∈ N . In addition, ei0 = e10, e0i = e01, eij =
e, ∀i, j ∈ N and i 6= j. As usual, we assume the regularity condition that J(v) = v− 1−F (v)f(v)
is an increasing function. The augmented virtual value function of a representative buyer
is defined as J˜(·) = J(·)+ c0+
∑
j≥0 ej1. The inverse function of J˜(·) is denoted by J˜−1(·).
The seller’s augmented value is J˜0(v0) = v0 +
∑
j≥0 ej0 + c0.
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Based on (12) and (13), ∀m ∈ V, the full participation winning probability of buyer
i, ∀i ∈ N is written as
ps∗i (m) =



1 if mi ≥ zi(m−i),
0 if mi < zi(m−i),
(15)
and his full participation payment is written as
xs†i (m) =



zi(m−i) + E, if i wins,
e + E, if j (≥ 0 ) wins, , where j 6= i ,
E, if the object is destroyed ,
(16)
where zi(m−i) = max{maxj 6=i,j∈N mj, J˜−1(max{0, J˜0(v0)})} and E = −minj≥0 e1j. In
addition, the seller keeps the object with probability of
ps∗0 (m) =



1, if J˜0 (v0 ) > J˜ (maxNj=1 mj ) and J˜0 (v0 ) ≥ 0 ,
0, otherwise.
(17)
(16) means that every buyer pays an entry fee of E = −minj≥0 e1j. Moreover, if
buyer i wins, he pays an additional zi(m−i). If he loses, he pays an externality-correcting
payment that equals the identity-specific externality he enjoys or suffers. From (17), it
is optimal for the seller to destroy the unsold object if and only if J˜0(v0) < 0, i.e., the
sum of the seller’s value, the destroying cost of the seller and the total externalities to the
buyers is negative when the seller keeps the item. When J˜0(v0) < 0, the seller is better
off by committing to destroy the object (eliminating the externalities) and collecting a
payment from each buyer that equals the externality to him.
Note that the nonparticipation threats (Definition 1) and (15)-(17) constitute a truth-
ful direct semirevelation mechanism that induces full participation. Clearly, this mecha-
nism is equivalent to the following modified second price auction.
Definition 5: (Auction A0) Every bidder pays an entry fee E = −minj≥0 e1j. The
highest buyer wins if his bid is higher than the reserve price J˜−1(max{0, J˜0(v0)}). If no
buyer bids higher than the reserve price, then the seller destroys the item if and only if
J˜0(v0) < 0. The winning bidder pays the second highest bid or the reserve price, whichever
is higher. Every losing buyer pays an externality-correcting payment that equals the al-
locative identity-specific externality to him.
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Based on the above results, we have the following proposition that describes the
revenue-maximizing auction.
Proposition 3: In a symmetric setting with pure identity-specific externalities, the mod-
ified second-price sealed-bid auction A0 of Definition 5 together with the nonparticipation
threats of Definition 1 is revenue-maximizing.
Each buyer’s payment is adjusted by the amount of allocative externality to him,
while he suffers or enjoys this externality at the same time. This creates a situation
where buyers bid as if there is no externality on them. Based on similar arguments for
the standard second-price auction, bidding his true value is a weakly dominant strategy
for every buyer in the second price auction A0. This is why a modified second-price
auction with the externality-correcting payments is revenue-maximizing, provided that
the reserve price and entry fee are properly set. In auction A0, the entry fee is set at the
highest possible level which can be supported by the nonparticipation threats, and the
optimal reserve price is determined by the seller’s augmented value J˜0(v0).
Define B0 as a modified first-price auction, which differs from A0 only in terms of
the payments of the winning bidder, i.e., the winning bidder pays his own bid or the
reserve price J˜−1(max{0, J˜0(v0)}), whichever is higher. Based on Proposition 3 and the
revenue equivalence theorem of Proposition 1, we have that auction B0 with the threats
of Definition 1 is also revenue-maximizing.
4.2 The Case of Pure Financial Externalities
In this section, we conduct further studies on revenue-maximizing auctions for settings
with pure financial externalities. Useful linkages between revenue-maximizing auctions
for settings with and without externalities are established based on the insights of Section
3. Specifically, when seller does not value the item, we will establish one-to-one corre-
spondences between revenue-maximizing auctions with and without financial externalities.
Therefore, revenue-maximizing auctions for various settings of financial externalities can
be obtained through transforming the revenue-maximizing second-price and/or first-price
auctions for regular settings without externalities. In this sense, our findings provide a
general approach for deriving the revenue-maximizing auctions in a variety of settings
with financial externalities.
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4.2.1 General Settings
So far the literature on auction with financial externalities has focused on symmetric
settings. Proposition 2 rather applies to general settings allowing asymmetry among
bidders. We first apply Proposition 2 and present the revenue-maximizing mechanism for
a general setting. We consider the case where eij = 0, ∀0 ≤ i, j ≤ N in the settings of
Section 2.2. The augmented virtual values of the players can be simplified as J i(vi) =
Ji(vi)
d + c0, i ∈ N and J0(v0) = v0 + c0, where d = 1 −
∑
j∈N αj. Note that d = 1
corresponds to the case of no externalities. The inverse function of J i(·) is denoted by
J−1i (·). In this case, the nonparticipation threats of Definition 1 take the following form
in this setting.
Definition 1′: (Nonparticipation Threats) If at least one bidder does not participate,
the seller keeps the item by himself, all participating bidders pay zero.
Following Definitions 2-4, we introduce the following full participation winning prob-
ability and payment functions.
∀m ∈ V, ∀i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N},
p∗i (m) =



1, if J i(mi) > maxNj=0 ,j 6=i J j (mj ) and J i(mi) ≥ 0 ,
0, otherwise,
(18)
and ∀i ∈ N ,
x†i(m) =



J−1i (maxNj=0,j 6=i J j(mj)), if i wins,
0, Otherwise.
(19)
Let x†(m)N×1 = (x
†
i (m)). We next define another set of full participation payments
functions x∗(m)N×1 = (x∗i (m)):
x∗(m) = Γ−1 · x†(m). (20)
According to Propositions 2, we have the following result.
Corollary 3: The nonparticipation threats of Definition 1′, full participation winning
probabilities (18) and payments (20) constitute a revenue-maximizing truthful direct semi-
revelation mechanism.
According to (18), if v0 > 0, then higher externalities (lower d ∈ (0, 1]) lead to higher
winning probabilities for all buyers and lower probability for the seller to keep the item.
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Note that the item is never destroyed as J0(v0) ≥ 0 in this case. Clearly, when d = 1,
(18) and (19) give a revenue-maximizing truthful direct semirevelation mechanism in a
setting without externalities.
4.2.2 When Seller Does Not Value the Object
The assumption of v0 = 0 has been commonly adopted in the literature of auction design
with financial externalities, such as Maasland and Onderstal (2002, 2007) and Goeree,
Maasland, Onderstal and Turner (2005) and Engers and McManus (2007).
When v0 = 0, neither (18) or (19) depends on d ∈ [0, 1). Therefore, we can replace
the J i(·) in (18) and (19) by Ji(·) and Corollary 3 still holds. In addition, according to
Myerson (1981), (18) and (19) with J i(·) replaced by Ji(·) constitute a revenue-maximizing
mechanism without financial externalities.19 Based on these observations, the relation
between the seller’s optimal expected revenue with and without financial externalities is
discovered as in the next proposition.
Proposition 4: Suppose v0 = 0. The seller’s optimal expected revenue with financial
externalities equals 1d times of that without externalities. Thus, seller’s optimal expected
revenue increases with the financial externalities among the buyers.
Proof: See Appendix.
Based on the above discussions, the revenue-maximizing mechanisms for the cases with
and without externalities can be obtained from each other solely through transforming
the payment functions. In the next proposition, we show that this statement holds in a
context of general mechanisms.
Proposition 5: There exists a one-to-one correspondence between revenue-maximizing
mechanisms with and without financial externalities. Every mechanism can be obtained
from its counterpart solely through transforming the payment functions using matrix Γ.
Specifically, x˜ = Γ−1x where x˜ is the payment functions for the setting with externalities
and x is the payments for the setting without externalities.
Proof: See Appendix.
Thus, a useful connection between the revenue-maximizing mechanisms with and with-
out financial externalities is disclosed. This result thus provides a general approach for
revenue-maximizing auction design with financial externalities when v0 = 0. Provided
19This result is also implied by Corollary 3 with d = 1.
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that we know a revenue-maximizing mechanism without externalities and the specific
form of financial externalities (i.e., we know Γ), then a revenue-maximizing mechanism
with financial externalities can simply be obtained through transforming the payment
functions appropriately by adding a term that adjusts for the financial externalities.
Next, we present some further results on auction design with financial externalities.
To begin, we have the following result from Proposition 5.
Corollary 4: Seller’s optimal expected revenue does not depend on the distribution of the
externalities across the buyers. In other words, only the sum of all αi counts.
In addition, when v0 = 0, the Corollary 3 revenue-maximizing mechanism can be
implemented through the following auction.
(a.1) There is no entry fee, the reserve price for buyer i, ∀i ∈ N is vˆi (≥ vi), which is
the unique solution of Ji(vˆi) = 0;
(a.2) If at least one buyer does not participate, the seller keeps the item, no bidder pays;
(a.3) If all participate, we denote buyer i’s bid by bi, ∀i ∈ N . Buyer i wins if Ji(bi) is the
highest among all Jj(bj), ∀j ∈ N and bi ≥ vˆi. Ties are broken randomly. Suppose buyer
i, ∀i ∈ N is the winner. The payments are the following. First, buyer i pays z1, which is
J−1i (maxNj=1,j 6=i Jj(bj)) or the reserve price vˆi (≥ vi), whichever is higher. Second, every
buyer j ∈ N pays z2 = αjz11−∑Ni=1 αi
. If no bidder wins, the seller keeps the item, and no one
pays.
This result can also be derived from Proposition 5. From Myerson (1981), we have
that in the setting without externalities, the auction defined in (a.1) to (a.3) with z2 = 0
is revenue-maximizing. It follows from Proposition 5 that the mechanism defined in (a.1)
to (a.3) is revenue-maximizing with financial externalities.
Goeree, Maasland, Onderstal and Turner (2005) study a symmetric independent
private value setting where buyers’ values follow cumulative distribution function F (·)
on [v, v] and the seller’s value is zero. They assume that each buyer enjoys a positive
externality which equals a common proportion (denoted by α < 1N whereN is the number
of buyers) of the total payments of all buyers. They show that a two-stage lowest-price
all-pay auction with proper entry fee E0 and reserve price R is revenue-maximizing. In the
first stage, buyers make the decision whether or not to pay the entry fee and participate.
All types of buyers participate, however, there exists a bidding threshold vˆ (≥ v) which
is also the threshold of winning type. The bidding threshold vˆ is the unique solution of
21
J(vˆ) = 0, the reserve price R equals vˆF (vˆ)
N−1
1−α and the entry fee E0 equals
αR(N−1)(1−F (vˆ))
1−Nα .
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For this symmetric setting, the revenue-maximizing auction defined by (a.1) to (a.3)
can be described as follows.
(b.1) There is no entry fee, the reserve price is vˆ (≥ v);
(b.2) Same as (a.2);
(b.3) If all participate, the highest buyer wins if his bid is no less than the reserve price
vˆ, and his payment consists of two components. First, he pays z1, which is the second
highest bid or the reserve price vˆ (> v), whichever is higher. Second, every buyer pays
z2, where z2 = αz11−αN > 0. If the highest bid is less than vˆ, the seller keeps the item, and
no one pays.
Since the auction defined by (b.1), (b.2) and (b.3) is also revenue-maximizing, we thus
have the following result.
Corollary 5: The modified second price auction defined by (b.1)− (b.3) is revenue equiv-
alent to the revenue-maximizing two-stage lowest-price all-pay auction established by Go-
eree, Maasland, Onderstal and Turner (2005).
Note that in a symmetric setting without externalities, a first-price auction with reserve
price vˆ is also revenue-maximizing. Thus a revenue equivalent modified first price auction
can also be constructed following Proposition 5.
Interestingly, in the Section 4.2.2 auctions, the optimal reserve prices are set in the
same way as in Myerson (1981) where no externalities is involved. This result holds
because v0 = 0. In this case, the augmented virtual values of the players (including seller)
are ranked in the same order as the regular virtual values. Thus, the optimal reserve price
should be set in the same way as in Myerson (1981).
5 Revenue-Maximization with Cross Shareholders
We now turn to the setting of the third example in Section 2.1 where the externalities
are rather due to cross shareholding among buyers. While we set c0 = 0, eij = 0 and
αi = 0, ∀i, j in the setting of Section 2.2 to eliminate externalities denoted by these
parameters, we allow cross shareholding among bidders who compete for a scarce resource.
In this section, vi denotes the added value of buyer i if he is the winner. Following
20Please refer to Proposition 5 in Goeree, Maasland, Onderstal and Turner (2005) for details.
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Dasgupta and Tsui (2004),21 we assume that player i(≥ 0) owes a fraction of sij ∈ [0, 1]
of the player j(≥ 0) where ∑i≥0 sij ≤ 1. We normalize s00 = 1, si0 = s0i = 0, ∀i ∈ N ,
i.e., there is no cross shareholding between buyers and seller.
Bidder i thus enjoys an identity-specific externalities sijvj if bidder j( 6= i) wins due to
the shareholding.22 This component sijvj is rather the private information of the winner.
Due to cross shareholding, bidder i suffers a negative externality −∑j∈N ,j 6=i sijxj from
other bidder’s payments xj, j ∈ N . When sii = 1, ∀i ∈ N , we have the standard setting
without cross shareholding.
The players’ payoffs are as follows. Buyer i’s payoff is sijvj −
∑
k∈N sikxk if player j
wins and payments of bidders are xk, ∀k ∈ N . The seller’s payoff is v0 +
∑
j∈N xj if he
keeps the item; his payoff is ∑j∈N xj if bidder i wins. The game extends as in Section
2.2. Shares sij are public information, which is revealed at time 0.
For any truthful direct semirevelation mechanism (p,x) implementing full participa-
tion, the seller’s expected revenue is given by:
R˜(p,x) = Ev
{
v0p0(v) +
N∑
i=1
xi(v)
}
. (21)
For buyer i with private value vi, if he submits signal mi ∈ Mi, his interim expected
payoff is given by:
U˜i(vi, mi;p,x) = Ev−i
{∑
j≥0
sijvj pj(mi,v−i)−
∑
j∈N
sijxj(mi,v−i)
}
. (22)
The seller’s optimization problem is to find the revenue-maximizing truthful direct
semirevelation mechanism (p˜∗, x˜∗) that implements full participation. In other words,
the seller maximizes R˜(p,x) subject to constrains (4)-(6) where Ui(·, ·; ·, ·) functions are
replaced by U˜i(·, ·; ·, ·). This optimization program can be solved following the same
method as in Section 3. A counterpart of Lemma 1 is the following.23
Lemma 3: Direct semirevelation mechanism (p,x) is a truthful direct semirevelation
mechanism that implements full participation, if and only if ∀i ∈ N the following condi-
21They studied standard first price and second price auctions.
22We can allow the identity-specific externalities take a form of hi(vj), which can alternatively be
interpreted as informational externalities.
23The proof is omitted as it follows Myerson (1981) closely.
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tions and (6) hold:
Qi(v′i;p) ≤ Qi(vi;p), ∀vi ≤ v′i ≤ vi ≤ vi, (23)
U˜i(vi, vi;p,x) = U˜i(vi, vi;p,x) + sii
∫ vi
vi
Qi(si;p)dsi, ∀vi ∈ [vi, vi], (24)
U˜i(vi, vi;p,x) ≥ U˜i(vi, ∅;p,x). (25)
Note that only (24) differs from its counterpart in Lemma 1. In Lemma 1, sii = 1, ∀i.
Define payment coefficient matrix SN×N = (sij)i,j≥1. We assume S is nonsingular. When
sij = 1N (symmetric cross shareholding), S actually is singular. We will discuss this case
at a later stage.
Define b˜ = (b˜i)N×1 = (S ′)−11IN×1 where all elements in 1IN×1 are 1. In this paper, we
focus on the case where bi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N . When there is a bi which is negative, the optimal
mechanism does not exist. This will be clear after we present Lemma 4.
Before we proceed to derive the expression for the seller’s expected revenue from a
truthful direct semirevelation mechanism, we further introduce the following definitions
of generalized virtual values of players.
Definition 0′: (Generalized Virtual Values) J¨i(vi) = vi
∑
j∈N b˜jsji− b˜isii 1−F (vi)f(vi) , i ∈
N are defined as the buyers’ generalized virtual value functions; and J¨0(v0) = v0 is defined
as the sellers’ generalized virtual value.
Note that the generalized virtual values cover the virtual values coined by Myerson
(1981) as a special case. When sii = 1, sij = 0, ∀i, j, we have b˜i = 1, ∀i. Thus the
generalized virtual values degenerate to the standard case. Clearly, J¨i(·) is increasing
when Ji(·) is increasing and bi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N . Similar to Lemma 2, we have the following
Lemma.24
Lemma 4: For a truthful direct semirevelation mechanism (p,x) that implements full
participation, the seller’s expected revenue can be written as
R˜(p,x) = Ev
(∑
i≥0
pi(v)J¨i(vi)
)
−
N∑
i=1
b˜iU˜i(vi, vi;p,x). (26)
24The proof is similar to that of Lemma 2. Note that b˜′Sx = 1I′x =
∑
i∈N xi, where x1×N = (xi).
This fact and (24) leads to Lemma 4. The proof is available from the author upon request.
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Lemma 4 differs from its counterpart in Myerson (1981) in the following aspects.
First, a generalized version of virtual values appears in (26); Second, due to the cross
shareholding, constants b˜j, j ∈ N appear both in J¨i(·) and before U˜i. From Lemma 4, it
is clear that when there is a b˜i < 0, then a higher U˜i(vi, vi;p,x) always benefits the seller.
Thus, an optimal mechanism must not exist. In addition, Lemma 4 immediately leads to
that a version of revenue equivalence theorem like Proposition 1 holds in a setting with
cross shareholding among buyers.
We are now ready to characterize the optimal mechanism. Before we present the
revenue-maximizing selling mechanism, we first introduce the following definitions.
Definition 2′: (Full Participation Winning Probabilities I) If all buyers participate
and buyer i, ∀i ∈ N submits signal mi ∈ [vi, vi], the object is assigned to the player
(including the seller) whose signal renders the highest “generalized virtual value”.25 Ties
are broken randomly.
The winning probabilities of Definition 2′ can be written equivalently as follows. ∀m ∈
V, ∀i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N},
p˜∗i (m) =



1, if J¨i(mi) > maxNj=0 ,j 6=i J¨j (mj ) and J¨i(mi) ≥ 0 ,
0, otherwise.
(27)
Definition 3′: (Full Participation Payments I)The winning buyer i pays siiJ¨−1i (max{0,
maxj 6=i J¨j(mj)});26 each losing buyer pays an externality-correcting payment (positive or
negative) that equals the allocative identity-specific externality (sijmj) to him.
The full participation payments of Definition 3’ can be written equivalently as follows.
∀m ∈ V, ∀i ∈ N ,
x˜†i (m) =



siiJ¨−1i (maxNj=0,j 6=i J¨j(mj)), if i wins,
sijmj, if j (≥ 0 ) wins, where j 6= i .
(28)
Let x˜†(m) = (x˜†i (m)). We next define another set of full participation payment
functions x˜∗(m) = (x˜∗i (m)).
Definition 4′: (Full Participation Payments II) x˜∗(m) = S−1 · x˜†(m).
25We treat the seller’s signal as v0.
26We use J¨−1i (·) to denote the inverse function of J¨i(·), i ∈ N . If x < J¨i(vi), J¨
−1
i (x) is defined as vi;
if x > J¨i(vi), J¨−1i (x) is defined as vi.
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Based on Lemma 4 and the above definitions, we are then able to present the revenue-
maximizing mechanism as in the following proposition.27
Proposition 6: The nonparticipation threats of Definition 1′, the full participation win-
ning probabilities and payments of Definitions 2′ and 4′ constitute a revenue-maximizing
truthful direct semirevelation mechanism. The mechanism implements full participation
of bidders.
Proposition 6 reveals that cross shareholding fundamentally affect the revenue-maximizing
auction through shaping players’ generalized virtual values, which completely determine
the winning probabilities. From Definition 4′, we see a unique feature of the payment
schedule. A proportion (sii) of every buyer’s payments (siix˜∗i (m)) include externality-
correcting components that equal the allocative identity-specific externalities (sijmj if
player j wins, zero otherwise) and financial externalities (−∑Nj 6=i sijx˜∗j(m)), respectively.
This is clear as siix˜∗i (m) = x˜
†
i (m)−
∑N
j 6=i sijx˜∗j(m).
Proposition 6 means that the methodology of Section 3 is applicable to the case with
cross shareholding among buyers, where the identity-specific externalities are private in-
formation of the winner, and the financial externalities take the most general linear form.
We now turn to the case with symmetric cross shareholding among buyers. In this
case, sij = 1N in matrix S, thus S is singular and Proposition 6 does not apply. Though
we can set b˜i = 1 such that a result of (26) can still be obtained, the payments schedule
x˜∗(m) that is incentive compatible with the optimal winning probabilities p˜∗(m) does
not exist. This means that the optimal winning probabilities can not be defined as p˜∗(m)
of Definition 2′. These results are rather surprising as one may expect symmetric cross
shareholding to be the simplest case. Further work remains to be done in this direction.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies auction design with identity-specific and financial externalities. We
find that these two types of externalities interact fundamentally through shaping players’
externality-augmented virtual values, which are obtained from the regular virtual values
by adjusting for the externalities and seller’s destroying cost. At the optimum, the win-
ning probabilities of the players are determined by their augmented virtual values. The
27The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2. It is available from the author upon request.
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player with the highest externality-augmented virtual value wins given that it is positive.
Both types of externalities affect the winning probabilities completely through the same
channel of modifying players’ virtual values. A unique feature of the revenue-maximizing
mechanism is that buyers’ payments consist of externality-correcting components that
equal the two types of allocative externalities to them. These components eliminate the
impact of the externalities on the strategic bidding behavior. Our study provides a unified
treatment for revenue-maximizing mechanism design with pure identity-specific or finan-
cial externalities. In symmetric settings, modified second-price and first-price auctions
with externality-correcting payments are established to be revenue-maximizing.
We find that introducing the possibility for the seller to destroy the item enlarges
the freedom of revenue-maximizing mechanism design, when there exist identity-specific
externalities between seller and buyers. At the optimum, the seller destroys the unsold
item if and only if his augmented value is negative. Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti
(1996) point out that the seller is better off by not selling at all if the total identity-specific
externalities generated by a sale is larger than total values. Our analysis reveals that the
seller can be further better off by physically destroying the item while extracting payments
from all buyers, if his augmented value is negative. This reveals that the crucial force
driving the dismantling result is the identity-specific externalities on the buyers imposed
by the seller instead of those among the buyers.
When buyers suffer highly negative identity-specific externalities if the seller holds the
item, the seller’s optimal expected revenue increases as these externalities become more
negative. This provides an alternative explanation to why North Korea tries to convince
relevant countries that its nuclear weapons are powerful.
Financial externalities amplify the impact of the identity-specific externalities. Par-
ticularly, when the total identity-specific externalities on the buyers is negative when
the seller keeps the item, the existence of financial externalities among buyers further
decreases seller’s augmented value. Thus, financial externalities may lead the seller to
destroy the item, which may not be destroyed otherwise.
Our study leads to interesting findings on auction design for settings with pure financial
externalities. Especially for the case where the seller does not value the item, we estab-
lish one-to-one correspondence between revenue-maximizing auctions with and without
externalities. As a result, the revenue-maximizing auctions for a regular setting without
externalities need only be properly modified in the payments to be revenue-maximizing
27
in settings with financial externalities.
The methodology and insights developed apply to the case with cross shareholding
among buyers, where the identity-specific externalities are private information of the
winner, and the financial externalities take the most general linear form. However, when
financial externalities take nonlinear forms, generally our methodology no longer applies.
More works need to be done in this direction.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2: From (2),
∫ vi
vi
Ui(vi, vi;p,x)fi(vi)dvi
=
∫ vi
vi
(∫
V−i
(
vi pi(v) +
∑
j≥0
ei,j pj(v) − xi(v) + αi
∑
j∈N
xj(v)
)
f−i(v−i)dv−i
)
fi(vi)dvi
=
∫
V
(
vi pi(v) +
∑
j≥0
ei,j pj(v) − xi(v) + αi
∑
j∈N
xj(v)
)
f(v)dv. (A.1)
where f−i(v−i) =
∏N
j=1,j 6=i fj(vj) is the density of v−i, and f(v) =
∏N
i=1 fi(vi) is the density of
v. From (A.1), we have
1
1−
∑
j∈N αj
N∑
i=1
∫ vi
vi
Ui(vi, vi;p,x)fi(vi)dvi
=
∫
V
(
p0(v)
∑
i∈N
ei,0
1−
∑
j∈N αj
+
N∑
i=1
vi +
∑
j∈N ej,i
1−
∑
j∈N αj
pi(v)−
N∑
i=1
xi(v)
)
f(v)dv. (A.2)
Note that ei,i = 0, ∀i ≥ 0. From (1) and (A.2),
R(p,x) = −c0 −
1
1−
∑
j∈N αj
N∑
i=1
∫ vi
vi
Ui(vi, vi;p,x)fi(vi)dvi
+
∫
V
(
p0(v)(v0 + c0 +
∑
j≥0
ej,0
1−
∑
j∈N αj
) +
N∑
i=1
pi(v)(
vi +
∑
j∈N ej,i
1−
∑
j∈N αj
+ e0,i + c0)
)
f(v)dv.(A.3)
From (9), we have
∫ vi
vi
Ui(vi, vi;p,x)fi(vi)dvi =
∫ vi
vi
[Ui(vi, vi;p,x) +
∫ vi
vi
Qi(si;p)dsi]fi(vi)dvi
= Ui(vi, vi;p,x) +
∫ vi
vi
[
∫ vi
vi
Qi(si;p)dsi]fi(vi)dvi
= Ui(vi, vi;p,x) +
∫ vi
vi
[
∫ vi
si
fi(vi)dvi]Qi(si;p)dsi
= Ui(vi, vi;p,x) +
∫ vi
vi
[1− Fi(si)]Qi(si;p)dsi. (A.4)
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From (7), we have
∫ vi
vi
[1− Fi(si)]Qi(si;p)dsi
=
∫ vi
vi
[1− Fi(si)]
{∫
V−i
pi(si,v−i)f−i(v−i)dv−i
}
dsi
=
∫
V
pi(v)
1− Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
f(v)dv. (A.5)
From (A.4) and (A.5), we have
N∑
i=1
∫ vi
vi
Ui(vi, vi;p,x)fi(vi)dvi
=
N∑
i=1
Ui(vi, vi;p,x) +
∫
V
( N∑
i=1
pi(v)
1− Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
)
f(v)dv. (A.6)
From (A.3) and (A.6), we have (11). 2
Proof of Proposition 1: According to the semirevelation principle, for any mechanism that
implements full participation, there must exist an equivalent truthful direct semirevelation mech-
anism that delivers the same participation and allocation for any v ∈ V, including the winning
probability for every player and payment for every bidder. The result in this proposition imme-
diately comes from applying Lemmas 1 and 2 to this equivalent mechanism. 2
Proof of Proposition 2: From (11), a truthful direct semirevelation mechanism that induces
full participation must be revenue-maximizing if it satisfies the following two conditions. First, it
minimizes Ui(vi, vi;p,x), ∀i ∈ N . Second, it also maximizes
∑N
i=0 pi(v)J˜i(vi), ∀v ∈ V. We show
that the direct semirevelation mechanism (p∗,x∗) of Proposition 2 satisfies the above criteria
and thus maximizes the seller’s expected revenue. We then verify that (p∗,x∗) is truthful.
First, the nonparticipation threats of Definition 1 push Ui(vi, ∅;p,x) to take the lowest
possible value minj≥0 ei,j. Note that we assume that the seller is cashless. Thus he cannot
create negative financial externalities to the nonparticipant by manipulating the payments of
the participants.
Second, the set of full-participation winning probability functions of Definition 2 clearly
maximizes
∑N
i=0 pi(v)J˜i(vi),∀v ∈ V.
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Third, the set of full-participation payment functions of Definition 4 drive Ui(vi, vi;p,x) to
exactly equal Ui(vi, ∅;p,x), which in turn equals minj≥0 ei,j. Note that Ui(vi, vi;p,x) cannot
be lower than Ui(vi, ∅;p,x) from (10).
From Definitions 2, 3 and 4, we can verify that
x∗i (v) − αi
∑
j∈N
x∗j (v) = x
†
i (v)
= vi p∗i (v) +
∑
j≥0
ei,j p∗j (v)−minj≥0 ei,j −
∫ vi
vi
p∗i (si,v−i)dsi, ∀i ∈ N . (A.7)
Therefore, for p∗i (·), 0 ≤ i ≤ N and x∗i (·), i ∈ N , (2) leads to
Ui(vi, vi;p∗,x∗)
= Ev−i
(
vi p∗i (vi,v−i) +
∑
j≥0
ei,j p∗j(vi,v−i)− x∗i (vi,v−i) + αi
∑
j∈N
x∗j(vi,v−i)
)
= min
j≥0
ei,j. (A.8)
Thus, we have shown that the Proposition 2 mechanism minimizes Ui(vi, vi;p,x), ∀i ∈ N ,
and it also maximizes
∑N
i=0 pi(v)J˜i(vi), ∀v ∈ V.
The full-participation winning probabilities and payments p∗(·) and x∗(·) together with the
nonparticipation threats of Definition 1 lead to a Nash equilibrium in which every type of buyers
participates and reveals truthfully their types, because the conditions in lemma 1 are satisfied.
We thus have that the full-participation winning probabilities and payments p∗(·) and x∗(·)
together with the nonparticipation threats constitute a truthful direct semirevelation mecha-
nism that maximizes the seller’s expected revenue. In the same spirit of Jehiel, Moldovanu and
Stacchetti (1996), there is no need to consider the joint deviation from the Nash equilibrium.28
Thus all the other winning probabilities and payments functions which are not relevant to the
equilibrium path can be specified in any way. 2
Proof of Proposition 4: Since the winning probabilities (18) of all players do not depend on
d ∈ (0, 1] if v0 = 0, the result follows from (11) and (15) immediately. Note that the lowest
types vi, i ∈ N always get zero payoff at the optimum in this setting. 2
Proof of Proposition 5: Suppose (p,x) is a revenue-maximizing general mechanism for the
case of no externalities, where p = (pi(·)) and x = (xi(·)). Define x˜ = Γ−1x. Thus if (p, x˜) is
28Footnote 11 in Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996) points out that joint deviations of buyers are
irrelevant since full-participation Nash equilibrium is studied.
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adopted for the case with financial externalities, then every bidder i has to pay the externalities
he enjoys/suffers on top of xi(·) by the construction of x˜i(·). Assume si(vi) is the equilibrium
strategy of bidder i when (p,x) is adopted in the setting without externalities, then clearly si(vi)
is also the equilibrium strategy of bidder i when (p, x˜) is adopted in the setting with financial
externalities.
Let s(v) = (s1(v1), · · · , sN (vN )). Note that Ev(
∑N
j=1 xj(s(v))) is the seller’s expected rev-
enue from (p,x) in the setting without externalities, and Ev(
∑N
j=1 x˜j(s(v))) is the seller’s ex-
pected revenue from (p, x˜) in the setting with financial externalities.29 Since
∑N
j=1 xj(s(v)) =
d
∑N
j=1 x˜j(s(v)), we have Ev(
∑N
j=1 xj(s(v))) = dEv(
∑N
j=1 x˜j(s(v))). As a result, Proposition 5
implies that (p, x˜) must be revenue-maximizing in the setting with financial externalities.
If (p˜, x˜) is a revenue-maximizing general mechanism for the case with externalities, where
p˜ = (p˜i(·)) and x˜ = (x˜i(·)). Define x = Γx˜. Similarly, we can show that (p˜,x) is a revenue-
maximizing general mechanism for the case without externalities. 2
29Note that destroying the item is never desired in the case of financial externalities.
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